平型关大捷真相|抗日战争|八路军|林彪|聂荣臻|国共内战|日军|王局拍案20240321

王局拍案
21 Mar 202427:42

Summary

TLDRThis video script delves into the historical intricacies of a famous photo from the Pingxingguan campaign, challenging the established narrative in Chinese textbooks. It reveals that the photo, depicting a scene from the 1937 Eighth Route Army's battle, was actually staged post-campaign. The narrative further explores discrepancies in the historical account of the Eighth Route Army's victory, contrasting exaggerated claims with factual evidence from Japanese military archives. Professor Jiang Keshi's research is highlighted, showcasing his investigation into the real events versus the propagated stories, urging a reevaluation of historical narratives and the impact of political propaganda on historical truth.

Takeaways

  • 💬 The widely recognized photo of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the Pingxingguan campaign is actually a reenacted scene, not a real battle moment.
  • 📈 The real Pingxingguan campaign and the famous photo were not aligned in time or location; the photo was taken in the Taihang Mountains post-campaign for a documentary.
  • 📝 Professor Jiang Keshi, a Chinese scholar working in Japan, conducted extensive research into the discrepancies between Chinese and Japanese wartime archives, revealing significant differences in the historical narrative of the Pingxingguan campaign.
  • 📊 The commonly accepted figures of Japanese casualties during the Pingxingguan campaign have been greatly exaggerated in Chinese historical narratives, with actual casualties far lower than reported.
  • 🌍 The strategic importance of the Pingxingguan campaign has been inflated in official Chinese history to serve various political and nationalistic purposes over the years.
  • 🛡️ The Eighth Route Army's strategy during the Pingxingguan campaign involved exploiting terrain for ambushes rather than direct confrontations, reflecting a nuanced approach to military engagements.
  • 📖 Professor Jiang Keshi's book challenges the established narrative by comparing Japanese military archives with Chinese accounts, highlighting the role of propaganda in shaping historical memory.
  • 🖥 The narrative of significant victories like the Pingxingguan campaign and the portrayal of heroic actions have been instrumentalized for political propaganda, often diverging from historical facts.
  • 🌐 The manipulation of historical events like the Pingxingguan campaign illustrates broader issues in the representation of Sino-Japanese War history, impacting contemporary perceptions and relations.
  • 📚 Professor Jiang Keshi's research underscores the importance of approaching historical events with a critical eye, encouraging a reevaluation of nationalistic narratives based on propaganda.

Q & A

  • What is the significance of the photo from the 1937 Pingxingguan campaign in Chinese history?

    -The photo from the 1937 Pingxingguan campaign is significant in Chinese history as it is widely recognized in Chinese textbooks and history museums. It represents a moment from the China's War of Resistance against Japan, depicting a heavy machine gun position of the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division.

  • Why is the actual location and time of the photograph's capture different from what is commonly believed?

    -The actual location and time of the photograph's capture differ from common belief because it was taken in October 1937, after the Pingxingguan campaign had ended, not during the battle at Pingxingguan as often thought. It was part of a reenacted scene for a documentary shot by a director from a film studio in the Nationalist-controlled area.

  • Who were Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen in the context of the 115th Division?

    -Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen were the leaders of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the Pingxingguan campaign. Lin Biao was the commander, and Nie Rongzhen was the deputy commander of the division.

  • What was the strategic significance of the Pingxingguan campaign in the War of Resistance against Japan?

    -The Pingxingguan campaign was strategically significant as it marked the first major victory of the Eighth Route Army, and also the first significant victory for the entire Chinese military during the War of Resistance against Japan.

  • How did Professor Jiang Keshi contribute to the understanding of the Pingxingguan campaign?

    -Professor Jiang Keshi, a Chinese professor working in Japan, contributed to the understanding of the Pingxingguan campaign by researching Japanese military archives. His work revealed discrepancies between these archives and the historical materials released by the CCP, providing a more accurate picture of the campaign's events.

  • What discrepancies did Professor Jiang Keshi find between Japanese military archives and CCP narratives?

    -Professor Jiang Keshi found significant discrepancies between Japanese military archives and CCP narratives, particularly in the number of Japanese casualties and the portrayal of certain battles. For instance, the CCP claimed the elimination of over 1,000 Japanese troops at Pingxingguan, whereas Japanese records showed a much lower number of casualties.

  • How was the Pingxingguan campaign exploited politically over the years?

    -The Pingxingguan campaign was politically exploited in various ways. Initially, it was exaggerated to boost national morale against Japan. Later, the Communist Party used it to assert its role in the resistance against Japan during its conflict with the KMT. After the founding of the PRC, it was used to reinforce war memories and shape patriotism and nationalism.

  • What does the story behind the photo and the Pingxingguan campaign reveal about historical narratives?

    -The story behind the photo and the Pingxingguan campaign reveals that historical narratives can often be influenced by political propaganda and may not always align with actual events. It highlights the importance of cross-referencing different sources to obtain a more accurate understanding of history.

  • Who was Jiang Keshi and what was his background?

    -Jiang Keshi is a Chinese professor who works at Okayama University in Japan. He originally studied literature and became a professor after obtaining his PhD. His interest in the history of China's War of Resistance against Japan was sparked by his discovery of wartime military archives released by Japan.

  • What impact did Professor Jiang Keshi's research have on the perception of the Pingxingguan campaign?

    -Professor Jiang Keshi's research significantly impacted the perception of the Pingxingguan campaign by challenging the established narratives. By comparing Japanese military archives with CCP accounts, he presented a more nuanced and potentially more accurate view of the campaign, leading to a reevaluation of historical events and their portrayal.

Outlines

00:00

📸 The Misidentified Photo

The segment reveals the true origin of a widely recognized photo from China's War of Resistance against Japan, incorrectly associated with the 1937 Pingxingguan campaign. Despite its common appearance in textbooks and museums, the photo was actually staged in October 1937, after the campaign, in the Taihang Mountains by the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, led by Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen. A director from a Nationalist-controlled film studio captured this and other scenes to document the campaign, creating footage that later became an important, though misleading, historical artifact. The narrative discusses the absence of war correspondents for the Eighth Route Army at the time, leading to reliance on such reenactments for historical records. Jiang Keshi, a Chinese professor working in Japan, uncovered this discrepancy through his research, contrasting Japanese military archives with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) narratives, revealing significant differences in historical accounts.

05:03

🔍 The Battle Dynamics

This paragraph offers an in-depth analysis of the Pingxingguan campaign's strategic and tactical aspects, contrasting with the official narrative. It details the composition and objectives of Japan's 5th Division, highlighting its unexpected capture of Taiyuan as a result, not the initial goal. The narrative contrasts the numerical superiority of the Nationalist forces, including the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, against the Japanese. Despite the Eighth Route Army's smaller role, focusing on harassment and strategic ambushes, the so-called great victory on September 25 during the counterattack phase is scrutinized. Professor Jiang Keshi's research suggests that the ambush, widely attributed to Lin Biao's military genius, was a common military tactic already employed by the National Army. The segment concludes with a reassessment of the actual Japanese casualties, countering the exaggerated figures commonly cited in CCP narratives.

10:06

🎖️ The Questionable Victory

Exploring the aftermath of a specific engagement within the Pingxingguan campaign, this segment highlights the disproportionate casualty figures and questions the narrative of a grand victory. It narrates the encounter of a Japanese logistic troop with the Eighth Route Army, leading to a fierce battle but with significantly lower Japanese casualties than claimed by the CCP. The engagement involved a mix of combatants, including non-combat "special duty soldiers" and a smaller force of Japanese troops, against a much larger contingent of the Eighth Route Army. The narrative dissects the actual strategic situation, suggesting that Lin Biao's ambush aimed to conserve forces rather than engage in direct conflict, a move framed as strategic but not as heroic or as successful as later portrayed. The segment critically assesses the inflated claims of Japanese casualties and the exaggerated accounts of battlefield heroics in CCP propaganda.

15:08

📚 Historical Narratives and Propaganda

This paragraph delves into the broader implications of the Pingxingguan campaign's portrayal, reflecting on the role of historical narratives in national propaganda. It discusses how both Japan and the CCP have historically exaggerated military achievements to foster nationalistic sentiments and create heroes. The segment highlights discrepancies in casualty figures between Japanese records and CCP claims, illustrating the extent of propaganda's influence on historical perception. It also touches on the post-war treatment of such narratives in Japan and China, pointing out the long-term effects of propaganda on national memory and identity. The narrative underscores the importance of critically examining historical accounts to understand the past accurately and the challenges of reconciling propaganda-driven narratives with factual history.

20:10

🕊️ The Impact of Exaggerated Narratives

Focusing on the aftermath and reinterpretation of the Pingxingguan campaign, this section discusses the exploitation of historical events for political purposes across three distinct periods in Chinese history. It critiques the CCP's manipulation of historical narratives for fostering nationalism and justifying its role in the War of Resistance against Japan. The segment critically examines the creation of so-called common memories, such as the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, revealing discrepancies between these narratives and factual events as documented in Japanese archives. The narrative argues that such distortions of history serve propaganda purposes but hinder a genuine understanding of history and reconciliation among East Asian countries.

25:13

📖 Reflecting on Historical Truth

The final paragraph summarizes the overarching message of the script, emphasizing the importance of confronting historical truth beyond propaganda and nationalistic narratives. It reflects on the limitations and dangers of a narrative system that instrumentalizes history for political ends, arguing that such practices obstruct genuine understanding and reconciliation. The segment concludes with a call to action for the audience to engage with Professor Jiang Keshi's book for a more nuanced perspective on history, underscoring the need for a historiographical approach to understanding past events and their implications for the present and future.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Pingxingguan campaign

The Pingxingguan campaign refers to a significant battle during the Second Sino-Japanese War, highlighted as the first major victory of the Eighth Route Army against Japanese forces. This event is depicted in the script as a pivotal moment in Chinese resistance history. However, the script reveals discrepancies in historical accounts, particularly in the numbers of Japanese troops reported to have been eliminated, showcasing how narratives have been shaped and reshaped over time for various purposes.

💡115th Division

The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, led by Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, plays a central role in the script's narrative. This division's actions during the Pingxingguan campaign and their involvement in a staged photo shoot to reenact battle scenes for a documentary underline the complexities of war representation and the construction of historical narratives.

💡Historical discrepancies

This concept emerges from the script's discussion on the variances between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) narratives, Japanese military archives, and the actual events that took place during the Pingxingguan campaign. The changing numbers of Japanese casualties and the roles of different forces highlight the fluid nature of historical accounts, influenced by political and ideological needs.

💡Professor Jiang Keshi

A Chinese professor working in Japan, Jiang Keshi is central to the script for his research on the War of Resistance against Japan, using Japanese military archives. His work, particularly on the Pingxingguan campaign, challenges the official CCP narratives and underscores the importance of diverse sources in understanding history accurately.

💡Propaganda

The script touches on how both the CCP and Japan used propaganda to shape nationalistic sentiments and historical narratives. By comparing exaggerated military achievements with archival evidence, it suggests that political motives often distort historical facts, leading to entrenched national myths and misconceptions.

💡Political exploitation

Refers to the manipulation of historical events like the Pingxingguan campaign for political gain. The script outlines three instances of exploitation by the CCP, ranging from boosting national morale, legitimizing its role in the war against Japan, and influencing Sino-Japanese relations post-1945. This highlights the interplay between history, memory, and political power.

💡CCP narratives

The official stories and accounts of historical events as told by the Chinese Communist Party, which often emphasize the party's heroism and successes. The script critically examines these narratives, especially around the Pingxingguan campaign, revealing discrepancies and the shaping of history to serve political ends.

💡Japanese military archives

Used by Professor Jiang Keshi in his research, these archives provide a contrasting account to CCP narratives of the Sino-Japanese War. The script underscores the importance of these archives in challenging established historical accounts and offering a more nuanced understanding of events like the Pingxingguan campaign.

💡Reenactment

This term is used in the script to describe how a battle scene from the Pingxingguan campaign was staged for a documentary, highlighting the manipulation of historical representation for ideological purposes. This reenactment, meant to document historical events, paradoxically contributes to the creation of myth rather than an accurate historical record.

💡National memory

National memory refers to the collective remembrance of past events shared by a nation's people, often shaped by official narratives and propaganda. The script discusses how events like the Pingxingguan campaign become part of China's national memory, albeit in a manner that may not fully align with historical facts, demonstrating the power of narrative in shaping collective identity and perceptions.

Highlights

A widely recognized photo of a heavy machine gun position during the Pingxingguan campaign is actually a reenactment, not taken during the battle as commonly believed.

The photo was taken in October 1937, after the Pingxingguan campaign, as part of a documentary film project.

Leaders of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army coordinated with a film studio to create a simulated battle scene in the Taihang Mountains.

The Pingxingguan victory narrative has been significantly exaggerated over the years, with reported Japanese casualties decreasing from 4,000 to 1,000.

Professor Jiang Keshi's research reveals discrepancies between CCP narratives and Japanese military archives on the War of Resistance.

The actual Japanese casualties during the Pingxingguan campaign were about 1,000, not the thousands often claimed in CCP narratives.

The strategic objective of Japan's 5th Division was not initially to capture Taiyuan, indicating a misrepresentation of the campaign's intent.

Ambush strategies employed by the Eighth Route Army were based on common military sense rather than unique tactical genius.

Japanese logistics units, misrepresented as main combat forces in some narratives, were actually comprised mostly of non-combat personnel.

The true number of Japanese casualties in the Pingxingguan campaign, as verified by Jiang Keshi, was significantly lower than previously claimed.

Political propaganda on both sides of the war exaggerated military achievements to create national heroes.

Historical narratives, including those of the Pingxingguan campaign and the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, have been instrumentalized for propaganda.

The Battle of Taierzhuang and the Pingxingguan campaign were both exploited for political purposes by the CCP at various times.

Patriotism and nationalism in China have been shaped through dramatized and storied war memories, often diverging from historical facts.

Jiang Keshi's research challenges the reliability of common memories and narratives of the Anti-Japanese War, urging a reevaluation of history.

The narrative propaganda surrounding historical events can hinder true understanding and reconciliation in East Asia.

Transcripts

00:04

The photo you are now seeing

00:05

is very familiar to those with even a slight understanding of China's War of Resistance

00:09

It widely appears in Chinese textbooks and in the exhibition halls of history museums

00:14

Its caption notes that this is from 1937

00:17

a heavy machine gun position of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the Pingxingguan campaign

00:22

In the photo, a soldier is shooting in front of a heavy machine gun, with a commander standing behind

00:28

But today, I want to tell you about this photo

00:30

Actually, the shooting location is not Pingxingguan, nor was it taken in September 1937

00:36

In fact, this photo was taken in October 1937

00:40

after the Pingxingguan campaign had ended

00:41

The 115th Division, led by Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, hid in the Taihang Mountains

00:45

In October, a director from a film studio in the Nationalist-controlled area

00:49

came to the Taihang Mountains to shoot a documentary on the Pingxingguan campaign

00:55

So, they reenacted a Pingxingguan battle scene

00:59

in this area of the Taihang Mountains

01:02

To coordinate the operation, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai on September 23

01:06

sent a telegram to Lin Biao, the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and informed the deputy commander, Nie Rongzhen

01:12

The 115th Division was then deployed between Pingxingguan and Lingqiu

01:16

At that time, commanders of the Eighth Route Army, including Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen,

01:19

were gathered for a meeting, and a series of photos were taken

01:22

Then, they called the soldiers to the mountain, firing guns into the valley, creating a "bang bang bang" sound

01:27

took some photos, and also shot some cinematographic works

01:30

This movie later became

01:33

a key historical document referenced in narratives of the Pingxingguan campaign

01:37

But actually, neither this photo nor the captured footage

01:42

depict the real historical scenes that occurred during the Pingxingguan campaign

01:47

Because at that time, in 1937,

01:49

the Eighth Route Army did not have their own war correspondents

01:53

So why am I talking about this photo?

01:56

It's because the story behind this photo evokes quite a bit of emotion in me

02:01

Sometimes history

02:03

sometimes, you really can't tell if it's real history or a movie

02:08

The person who thoroughly researched the story behind this photo is a Chinese professor

02:12

His name is Jiang Keshi, and he is Chinese

02:16

but works as a professor in a Japanese university

02:19

In Japan, he originally studied literature, and after obtaining his PhD,

02:22

he became a professor at Okayama University in Japan. But in his spare time, he discovered

02:27

that Japan had released a lot of wartime military archives

02:30

These military archives, compared with the historical materials released by the CCP

02:35

including the narratives of history, had significant discrepancies

02:39

So, he became curious

02:41

and in his spare time, started to research the history of China's War of Resistance against Japan

02:46

Today, I'm going to talk about a book he researched

02:49

titled "The Pingxingguan Great Victory as Appeared in Japanese Military Archives"

02:55

Speaking of Pingxingguan, everyone knows, in the narratives of CCP history,

02:59

it was the first major victory of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance against Japan,

03:05

and also the first major victory for the entire Chinese military during the war

03:11

At that time, it was said that the 115th Division, commanded by Lin Biao at Pingxingguan,

03:16

eliminated over 4,000 Japanese troops

03:19

And then, over the years, this number seems to have "shrunk"

03:22

from 4,000 to 3,000, 3,000 to 2,000, and finally to 1,000

03:28

This force was changed from the main force to the follow-up force, then to the reinforcement force,

03:33

and then including the supply troops, changing back and forth

03:35

But basically, the current historical narrative has stabilized at 1,000 killed

03:41

And then, the description of this battle is very exciting

03:46

Talking about Lin Biao, as the commander,

03:48

went to Qiaogou near Pingxingguan three times for reconnaissance

03:52

Then, he planned an ambush in Qiaogou

03:59

At 7 a.m. on September 25, the enemy forces had all entered the ambush zone

04:04

The battle officially started, and the Eighth

04:12

Route Army surrounded and divided the confused Japanese troops.

04:16

After assessing the situation, the Japanese attempted to seize the high ground.

04:19

A fierce close combat ensued between the two sides.

04:23

But actually, what really happened in the Pingxingguan campaign?

04:26

I want to tell everyone that the claim of annihilating 1,000 Japanese troops is also greatly exaggerated.

04:33

Because in the entire Pingxingguan campaign, not the so-called great victory,

04:37

the total Japanese casualties throughout the campaign were about 1,000.

04:41

Here, I need to first explain the relationship between the Pingxingguan campaign and the so-called great victory.

04:46

The so-called Pingxingguan campaign started on September 21,

04:49

1937, initiated by Japan's 5th Division.

04:54

The 5th Division of Japan launched the Pingxingguan campaign merely to punish the Jin-Sui Army

04:59

because of the setback they suffered in the Suiyuan incident a year earlier.

05:02

So, a year later, they wanted to take revenge and deal with the Jin-Sui Army.

05:06

At that time, the 5th Division wasn't a full-strength division,

05:09

it had only three companies, totaling 4,500 men.

05:12

Their strategic goal wasn't to reach Taiyuan,

05:15

but unexpectedly, as the battle progressed, Taiyuan was captured.

05:19

But that was a result, not the initial strategic goal.

05:23

On September 21, Japan's 5th Division issued such a mobilization order.

05:28

The entire Pingxingguan campaign lasted for about three phases.

05:32

From September 22 to September 24, was the first phase.

05:35

The Japanese began their attack, facing the Jin-Sui Army at that time,

05:39

including Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army and Yan Xishan's Shanxi Army,

05:42

with both forces totaling about 60,000 men.

05:45

In terms of military strength, the Nationalist forces had the absolute advantage,

05:49

including the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, which had about three to four thousand men.

05:54

However, due to the superior equipment and combat effectiveness of the Japanese,

05:58

these 4,500 men, starting from September 22, launched the attack

06:02

and maintained the initiative on the battlefield until September 24.

06:06

But from September 25 to September 26, the Jin-Sui Army launched a counterattack,

06:11

starting to encircle and cut off the Japanese forces, including their supply lines.

06:15

During this counterattack phase, the strategic goal was to eliminate the 5th Division,

06:20

these 4,500 men, because after all, they were at a numerical disadvantage.

06:24

However, from September 26 to September 28, the Japanese reopened their supply lines

06:30

as reinforcements arrived from Lingqiu.

06:34

After reopening the supply lines, from September 29 to 30, they began

06:38

a comprehensive strategic counterattack, which outlines the course of the Pingxingguan campaign.

06:43

During the eight days of the Pingxingguan campaign,

06:46

the main battles took place between the Jin-Sui Army and the Japanese forces,

06:51

with the Eighth Route Army only harassing the flanks.

06:54

On September 25, when Yan Xishan was planning a full counterattack,

06:59

he issued combat orders to the Eighth Route Army,

07:01

requesting the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army to attack the Japanese flanks on the battlefield.

07:07

In fact, the so-called great victory at Pingxingguan occurred on September 25,

07:11

during the counterattack process of the entire Pingxingguan campaign,

07:14

the Eighth Route Army conducted an ambush on the flank.

07:18

This ambush took place near Pingxingguan

07:22

at a place called Qiaogou

07:27

To the Japanese Army's 5th Division combat headquarters in Guan Gou Village, a necessary path in between.

07:33

This road is about 3 kilometers long, with cliffs on both sides about 10 meters high.

07:38

At that time, this Guan Gou was the road that was being used.

07:42

Because at that time, whether it was the Japanese Army marching

07:45

or including the subsequent supplies, all had to go through this ditch.

07:48

So, was this ditch solely Lin Biao's own strategy at that time?

07:51

Actually, after Professor Jiang Keshi's verification, it was found not to be the case.

07:55

Why? Because, in fact, with this ditch, as soon as you see the site,

07:59

you would realize, if you have a bit of military common sense, you would set up an ambush here.

08:04

Moreover, from September 22 to September 24,

08:06

the National Army had already set up ambushes here several times.

08:10

It's just that at that time, the combat capability of the National Army was relatively poor.

08:12

When a battalion of troops met with the main force of the Japanese Army, they would collapse at the first contact.

08:17

Therefore, the Japanese Army didn't take the National Army's ambush seriously.

08:21

So Lin Biao setting up an ambush here on September 25 was actually common military sense,

08:26

not what you'd call a stroke of military genius.

08:30

That's the first point, the second point

08:31

is about how many Japanese soldiers were killed during the whole Pingxingguan campaign.

08:36

What exactly happened on the battlefield, Professor Jiang Keshi did a detailed verification.

08:42

His discovery, Lin Biao setting up an ambush in this bridge ditch,

08:46

actually had a real stroke of genius, what does this mean?

08:49

Because this bridge ditch, at that time, was located at the rear of the Japanese Army,

08:54

between their frontline combat troops and Lingqiu County.

09:00

So why set up an ambush here?

09:03

And the opening of his trumpet was facing the direction of the Japanese Army's frontline positions.

09:09

Therefore, Professor Jiang Keshi, after verification, believes that Lin Biao's intentions were here,

09:14

He did not want to actively attack those main forces,

09:17

he hoped that after Yan Xishan's Jinsui Army defeated the Japanese Army,

09:21

if the Japanese Army retreated from the front line, they would enter this pocket formation,

09:26

at that time, it would be possible to eliminate the remnants of the Japanese Army, without needing to pay a high price,

09:31

while also being able to expand the military achievements.

09:34

And Lin Biao's idea was very good, on one hand, to conserve strength and not engage in tough fights,

09:39

meanwhile, if the Jinsui Army really won, these defeated troops passing by here

09:43

I could still clean them up, smart, really strategic.

09:46

The real strategy is here.

09:48

Just coincidentally, after Lin Biao set up an ambush on September 25,

09:52

that day, really two battles occurred in this Qiao Gou.

09:56

These two battles, Professor Jiang Keshi did detailed verification in his book.

10:01

First, on that morning at 9:30, from the direction of Guan Gou Village,

10:05

about 50 vehicles came, a so-called Japanese Army logistic troop.

10:11

So why did they dispatch this logistic troop?

10:13

Upon checking the archives, it was very clear,

10:15

because from September 22 to September 24, after fighting for three days,

10:19

By September 24, they were somewhat unable to continue fighting, especially as the Shanxi forces began to counterattack.

10:24

On September 25, the Japanese Army requested this logistic unit

10:29

to return in the direction of Lingqiu County, to bring reinforcements.

10:33

Because they were unable to advance at the front, and the battlefield situation was unfavorable for them.

10:37

Thus, all 50 vehicles were empty, carrying nothing.

10:40

They were prepared to go there to bring back reinforcements. The person commanding this logistic unit

10:46

was Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka, a lieutenant colonel of the Japanese Army's logistic unit.

10:50

Logistic units, in Japanese military training, are considered a formal part of the order of battle,

10:54

but they are definitely not considered the main force.

10:57

This Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka was a lieutenant colonel of a logistic unit.

11:00

How many people were in this unit? Not quite 200, just over 100 people.

11:05

These hundred-plus people were the drivers, the porters,

11:10

plus some of their own combatants, roughly that number.

11:14

And they had no heavy weapons, only two machine guns in total.

11:18

Think about it, over a hundred people,

11:19

then at 9:30, they started fighting upon entering here. At that time, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army here

11:25

was led by Li Tianyou of the 686th Regiment.

11:27

This Li Tianyou later became a general after the founding of the PRC.

11:30

They began the attack, and the Japanese, wielding heavy machine guns, began to fire.

11:34

In fact, at that time, the Eighth Route Army's weapons and equipment were significantly better than the Japanese's.

11:38

Initially, after a brief moment of panic,

11:42

the Japanese quickly rushed to the mountains on both sides.

11:44

After occupying the high ground, they began to exchange fire with the Eighth Route Army.

11:49

In this, a Japanese squad of about twenty to thirty men

11:52

occupied a high ground called Laoye Temple.

11:54

Both sides engaged in a very intense fight for Laoye Temple's high ground.

11:59

If you look at the CCP's book on the Great Victory of Pingxingguan,

12:01

it contains a very important description about Laoye Temple.

12:06

This description is somewhat exaggerated,

12:08

claiming there were airplanes in the sky, tanks on the ground, and artillery.

12:12

As a result, after repeated bloody charges, the Eighth Route Army finally annihilated the enemy.

12:17

But actually, at that time, the Japanese only had twenty to thirty men with a light machine gun,

12:22

and they fought a fierce battle with the Eighth Route Army for 4 hours. Soon after the battle began,

12:26

Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka was shot and killed.

12:32

So, around 12:40, a lieutenant from Shimura at that time announced

12:37

they began to retreat upon receiving the order.

12:40

In the process, around 11:30, a rescue team arrived from the rear,

12:45

a squad of about 100 people.

12:47

So, the total Japanese combat forces in this area amounted to about 350 people.

12:52

And how many were there on the Eighth Route Army side? About 3,000, almost ten times the number of the Japanese forces.

12:57

But despite being ten times the number of the Japanese, this situation of the Eighth Route Army against the enemy

13:02

resulted in a fierce battle lasting 4 hours.

13:04

Moreover, the pocket formation on their side was not secured; the rear was always open.

13:08

At that time, the Eighth Route Army attempted to secure the rear pocket formation,

13:12

but a bayonet charge by the Japanese scattered the Eighth Route Army's forces.

13:17

Ultimately, the so-called pocket formation remained open.

13:21

So later, from 12:40, the Japanese began to retreat,

13:25

all the way from this bridge ditch back to their starting point.

13:30

Before leaving, they burned those vehicles.

13:33

By 3:30 pm, the Japanese had regrouped back in Guan Gou Village.

13:38

Then they began to tally the casualties of this battle, with the Japanese losing a total of 62 people.

13:44

For this battle, about 30 people were killed or wounded.

13:48

This was one of the main battlefields of the Pingxingguan campaign,

13:51

namely the main battlefield in the area around Laoye Temple.

13:54

The current location of the Pingxingguan Memorial is right here.

13:58

Coincidentally, while fighting near Laoye Temple,

14:01

around 11 am, another group of Japanese troops came from the northern part of the bridge ditch.

14:08

What were these Japanese troops doing?

14:11

They were coming from the Lingqiu direction, a Japanese luggage unit.

14:15

This luggage unit, with about 100 horses pulling carts loaded with luggage,

14:20

carried mainly dry bread and some cotton clothes,

14:25

intended for the front-line troops to deliver these supplies.

14:29

There were also a few pieces of combat supplies.

14:33

This unit had about seventy to eighty "special duty soldiers,"

14:37

plus 15 regular infantrymen.

14:40

What are "special duty soldiers"? Let me explain here:

14:42

In the Japanese army, "special duty soldiers" were actually non-combat personnel.

14:47

"Special duty soldier" is a euphemism.

14:48

Originally they were called "ronin."

14:51

"Ronin" sounds very discriminatory.

14:54

In essence, they were the labor force of the Japanese army.

14:57

These people did not need to fight and did not undergo military training

15:00

because they were meant to perform laborious tasks.

15:02

They transported the wounded, food, military doctors, and ammunition.

15:07

Thus, these people had no combat capability.

15:09

About 70 of these people, plus 15 escort soldiers, made up this unit.

15:15

That's this unit.

15:16

Then, before this unit entered the bridge ditch village,

15:20

they happened to encounter a group of seven people.

15:22

This group of seven, coming from Lingqiu and the headquarters,

15:26

included a staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto.

15:30

He was originally going to the frontline headquarters in a car,

15:34

but coincidentally, it rained heavily on the 24th,

15:37

and when they drove on the 25th, the car got stuck in the mud and couldn't move.

15:42

So after Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto got down,

15:44

he and his men began to proceed on foot.

15:47

Upon reaching the entrance of the bridge ditch, they joined up with the luggage transport unit.

15:54

Then they proceeded into the bridge ditch,

15:58

and upon entering, they encountered an encirclement by the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

16:04

This unit was almost entirely wiped out,

16:05

with nearly 100 people, only six survived.

16:10

At the beginning of the attack,

16:12

since these special duty soldiers had no combat experience,

16:15

they panicked amidst heavy machine guns, mortars, and grenades from above.

16:19

These men began to scatter in confusion.

16:23

Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto was a staff officer,

16:26

he was commanding on the spot, but he had hardly any troops to command.

16:29

He also rushed up the cliff and engaged in a firefight with the Eighth Route Army.

16:33

During the exchange of fire, their firepower gradually diminished.

16:38

Thus, only 6 people from this unit survived in the end.

16:40

These six hid in small caves,

16:44

or pretended to be dead, lying under dead horses.

16:47

They were later rescued by the Japanese returning to the battlefield.

16:52

The Pingxingguan campaign, in essence, unfolded like this,

16:56

it was not just a battle of Pingxingguan but a great victory.

16:59

The total number of Japanese casualties in the northern and southern battlefields has very precise numbers,

17:05

because the Japanese archives are very comprehensive.

17:08

After the war, they made battlefield summary reports,

17:12

and the deceased soldiers have death records.

17:15

Based on these death records, compensation was distributed to the families,

17:19

and the compensation from the Japanese Army was quite high.

17:21

It amounted to 20 times the annual income of the military.

17:26

You see, that's a lot.

17:27

The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare also retains complete records of this.

17:32

So, Professor Jiang Keshi compiled these numbers,

17:36

and the total number of Japanese casualties in the great victory of Pingxingguan was about 162.

17:41

For 158 of them, there are precise records of their names, military ranks

17:49

and addresses

17:52

This is very well preserved in the Japanese archives.

17:56

About 100 people were injured,

17:58

so adding up, it's a great victory in the Pingxingguan campaign.

18:01

The CCP's proclaimed great victory at Pingxingguan, the total casualties on the Japanese side were also about 200 people.

18:07

That's roughly the situation.

18:09

Think about it, compared to the CCP's propaganda of annihilating more than 1,000 enemies, the difference is quite significant.

18:14

It's seven or eight times less, right?

18:17

Why do I spend a whole day talking about this book?

18:20

I find Professor Jiang Keshi's point in this book particularly interesting.

18:23

He says that during the war, the political propaganda from both sides

18:28

inadvertently exaggerates military achievements.

18:32

Because political propaganda is about creating extreme national heroes.

18:36

It's not just the CCP; Japan did it too.

18:38

For example, Japan's propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War included a military god,

18:42

Yamaguchi, who was later proven to be fabricated.

18:46

And then during the Pacific War, wasn't Pearl Harbor attacked?

18:50

The Japanese propaganda of nine military gods bombing the American base,

18:56

later it was found they intentionally left one out,

19:00

one downed Japanese pilot.

19:03

This Japanese pilot landed on Roy Island, right?

19:06

After landing on Roy Island, it led to conflicts between the Japanese descendants and the natives later,

19:10

which directly resulted in all Japanese Americans being interned in camps.

19:15

But in Japanese propaganda, this part was completely removed,

19:17

that is, through such deliberate creation of extreme heroes,

19:21

to make ordinary people sacrifice themselves as cannon fodder for Japanese militarism.

19:27

That's how Japan did it, and the CCP did the same.

19:31

After the Pingxingguan great victory was first announced by the CCP,

19:36

Chiang Kai-shek really awarded commendations.

19:38

Why? Because at that time, there was the myth of the invincible Imperial Japanese Army.

19:44

So all of China was longing for a victory over the Japanese army.

19:47

The Pingxingguan great victory announced by the Eighth Route Army indeed boosted morale,

19:54

and Chiang Kai-shek was also cautious.

19:56

He encouraged the Eighth Route Army to fight the Japanese because at that time, the KMT and the CCP were at odds.

20:02

Although the Eighth Route Army went to the battlefield,

20:04

it was basically not controlled by the military group and operated independently.

20:10

So Chiang Kai-shek hoped to encourage the Eighth Route Army to really fight the Japanese.

20:15

This was the first time it was utilized.

20:16

So his view is that the three countries, China, Japan, and Korea,

20:20

actually explain history based on their own political stance,

20:25

rather than facing the true history, which makes reconciliation difficult.

20:30

But after the war, Japan, with its peace constitution,

20:34

these so-called extreme heroes

20:36

disappeared from textbooks and history.

20:40

Gradually, we are returning to a real historical scene.

20:45

From the complete disclosure of archives during the war by Japan,

20:50

and research in this area, you can see.

20:52

But it's different on the Chinese side; the Pingxingguan campaign was actually exploited

20:56

It was utilized three times, the first time as Professor Jiang Keshi mentioned

21:01

At that time, the entire Chinese nation hoped for a victory, so such a military achievement was exaggerated

21:06

Not only the Pingxingguan campaign but the Battle of Taierzhuang was also exaggerated

21:10

In the Japanese records, whether it was the Battle of Taierzhuang or including the Pingxingguan campaign

21:15

Both were very ordinary battles

21:18

And during the war, other feats by the Eighth Route Army were also crafted

21:21

We'll talk about that in a moment

21:22

The second exploitation was actually in 1945 when the KMT and CCP were going to fight

21:26

When the KMT and CCP were about to fight, the Communist Party had a theory

21:29

What was the theory?

21:30

It said that during the eight years of the War of Resistance, it was the CCP troops that were fighting

21:33

The KMT was actually hiding in the mountains, so now they want to reap the benefits

21:37

Didn't Mao write an article?

21:39

If you want to argue that the CCP was the mainstay in the resistance process

21:44

Then you must have examples, right? What are the examples?

21:47

Actually, during the entire eight years, the CCP could only showcase two battles against the Japanese

21:52

One is the Pingxingguan campaign, and the other is the Hundred Regiments Offensive

21:55

Therefore, the Pingxingguan campaign must be portrayed as a tremendous victory at that time

22:01

This was a political necessity

22:03

The third exploitation actually happened after the founding of the PRC

22:06

After the founding, Sino-Japanese relations have been fluctuating

22:08

As everyone knows, there was once a honeymoon period

22:10

But in the last two decades, Sino-Japanese relations have generally been discordant

22:15

The discordant result has led to

22:17

all kinds of war memories with Japan being repeatedly reinforced

22:23

Even repeatedly dramatized and storied

22:27

This is based not only on Sino-Japanese relations

22:30

But also on considerations of patriotism and nationalism

22:34

To shape a new common memory through

22:37

dramatization and storytelling of these wars

22:40

This common memory has nothing to do with the so-called historical facts.

22:45

Professor Jiang Keshi, through research, found that, in fact, several so-called common memories of the Anti-Japanese War

22:50

are false.

22:53

For example, the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain.

22:55

The Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, these five individuals, were actually trapped and then made a martyrdom act.

22:59

While it's quite heroic, the narrative process claims

23:05

they killed more than a hundred Japanese soldiers, and the five of them jumped off the cliff after running out of ammunition.

23:12

But Japanese archives have clear records

23:14

that during the entire battle involving the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, the Japanese army only had one person wounded.

23:19

So, you see, this narrative actually has nothing to do with historical facts.

23:24

And then there's the defense of Liu Zhuang.

23:25

At that time, Liu Zhuang had 82 members of the New Fourth Army.

23:29

This platoon, all martyred in the end, claimed to have killed several hundred Japanese soldiers at the time.

23:34

But upon checking Japanese archives, it was found that the Japanese army only had two people killed.

23:40

To say that these 82 people collectively achieved martyrdom is also quite remarkable.

23:43

But then, to exaggerate it to the extermination of several hundred Japanese soldiers

23:46

is utterly absurd.

23:49

So, you can see that historical narrative and political propaganda

23:53

actually have nothing to do with each other.

23:56

History has only become a carrier, just a tool.

24:02

But the problem is that such a narrative system that instrumentalizes history

24:07

is really harmful to us today, seriously understanding history and facing the future.

24:13

Think about it, the Sino-Japanese War has been over for more than 70 years.

24:19

But then, think about it, these countries in East Asia have not reconciled,

24:22

and everyone is still arguing every day.

24:24

One very important reason is that

24:27

we have not approached the true content of this historical event

24:31

with a historiographical attitude.

24:35

It's all based on a propagandistic attitude to explain history,

24:39

and this propaganda is actually stance-first, conclusion-first

24:43

All these Sino-Japanese historical narratives ultimately point towards a history of hatred, hating Japan,

24:50

rather than pointing towards a true history.

24:53

But, when all of this encounters a real historical detail,

24:57

such as these archives from the Japanese side,

24:58

you will find that all those historical constructs are utterly untenable.

25:05

But then, you realize that the truth of history

25:09

really doesn't matter much in the process of propaganda.

25:12

Wasn't there someone who spoke about the historical facts of the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain?

25:17

And as a result, they were judged by a court in Beijing,

25:20

saying this is the national common memory, this is the core value of socialism.

25:25

If you violate it, you're breaking the law, you're infringing on the honor of the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain.

25:32

But what's truly sad is, this so-called narrative propaganda

25:37

can only be sustained within a specific, closed information environment.

25:43

Once this barrier of information is opened,

25:46

people will find out that all these propagandas are false.

25:50

The entire narrative system is false.

25:54

Can it really build up our true nationalism and our patriotic feelings?

25:59

Or say, the nationalism and patriotism it builds up,